Allocation rules on networks by İlkılıç, R. & Kayı Ç.ğ.
Soc Choice Welf (2014) 43:877–892
DOI 10.1007/s00355-014-0815-x
Allocation rules on networks
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Abstract When allocating a resource, geographical and infrastructural constraints
have to be taken into account. We study the problem of distributing a resource through
a network from sources endowed with the resource to citizens with claims. A link
between a source and a citizen depicts the possibility of a transfer from the source
to the citizen. Given the endowments at each source, the claims of citizens, and the
network, the question is how to allocate the available resources among the citizens.
We consider a simple allocation problem that is free of network constraints, where
the total amount can be freely distributed. The simple allocation problem is a claims
problem where the total amount of claims is greater than what is available. We focus
on resource monotonic and anonymous bilateral principles satisfying a regularity con-
dition and extend these principles to allocation rules on networks. We require the
extension to preserve the essence of the bilateral principle for each pair of citizens in
the network. We call this condition pairwise robustness with respect to the bilateral
principle. We provide an algorithm and show that each bilateral principle has a unique
extension which is pairwise robust (Theorem 1). Next, we consider a Rawlsian criteria
of distributive justice and show that there is a unique “Rawls fair” rule that equals
the extension given by the algorithm (Theorem 2). Pairwise robustness and Rawlsian
fairness are two sides of the same coin, the former being a pairwise and the latter a
global requirement on the allocation given by a rule. We also show as a corollary that
any parametric principle can be extended to an allocation rule (Corollary 1). Finally,
we give applications of the algorithm for the egalitarian, the proportional, and the
contested garment bilateral principles (Example 1).
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1 Introduction
The world economy has become a densely connected network of supply centers and
demand nodes. This is true in particular for natural resources. Given geographical or
infrastructural constraints, it is important to understand how scarce resources should
be allocated. An example where such network constraints are essential is fresh water
resources. As a result of increasing population and developing economies, the need
for water is growing immensely. The principal issue is to have an efficient and fair
allocation of resources (Ansink and Weikard 2009; Hoekstra 2006). Some other exam-
ples are aid relief during natural disasters (Özdamar et al. 2004), common property
fisheries (İlkılıç 2011), and the distribution of utilities like electricity and natural gas
when there is a supply shock.
We study the problem of distributing a resource through a bipartite network between
citizens with positive claims (needs or entitlements) and sources that are endowed with
an amount of the desired resource.1 If there is a link between a source and a citizen,
then the citizen can receive the resource from the source. Each source has a limited
endowment of the resource and each citizen has a claim on the resource. Given the
network constraints, the claims of citizens, and the endowments at each source, the
question is how to allocate the resource among the citizens. An allocation rule assigns
to each citizen a quantity of resource satisfying the following feasibility constraints:
a citizen can not receive more than his claim and a source can not deliver more than
its endowment.
We study those problems where total claims exceeds total endowment.2 When
individuals have claims on a resource that sum up to more than what is available, how
should the resource be divided? This problem is a claims problem, formally introduced
by O’Neill (1982). Several solutions are commonly used in practice and analyzed in
theoretical work (Thomson 2003, 2006).
An allocation problem is defined by the endowments of the sources, the claims
of the citizens, and the network. First, we define a simple allocation problem that is
free of network constraints, where the total amount can be freely distributed between
the agents. The simple allocation problem is in fact a claims problem. A principle is
a standard of judgement3. which assigns a division of the total endowment between
the citizens for any simple allocation problem. We focus on bilateral principles on
two-citizen simple allocation problems. A bilateral principle is resource monotonic
if when the total endowment increases, each citizen receives at least as much as she
did initially. A bilateral principle is anonymous if the allocation given by the bilateral
principle does not depend on the names of the citizens.
The next property is for principles. Suppose a principle has been applied to a simple
problem and some citizens leave with what they are prescribed by the principle and the
total amount prescribed to these citizens by the principle reduced from the endowment.
1 For example, when the resource in question is fresh water, the sources are lakes, rivers, dams, etc. and
the citizens are cities.
2 If there is a group of agents on the network whose claims can be completely satisfied without any burden
on others, we can simply take those agents out of the network and focus on the “genuine” problem.
3 For example, the egalitarian principle, the proportional principle, the equal losses principle, etc.
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If we apply the principle to the problem with the remaining citizens and the remaining
endowment, then the initial prescribed allocation should not change for the remaining
citizens. A principle is consistent if it satisfies this invariance property. The weaker
version of the property obtained by focusing only on subgroups of two citizens is called
bilateral consistency. A bilateral principle admits a bilaterally consistent extension to
simple problems if the principle is bilaterally consistent and coincides with the bilateral
principle for each two-citizen simple problem. Similarly, a bilateral principle admits a
consistent extension to simple problems if there exists a principle which is consistent
and coincides with the bilateral principle for each two-citizen simple problem.
We focus on a class of resource monotonic and anonymous bilateral principles
satisfying a regularity condition which was introduced in Dagan and Volij (1997). We
build on the extendability of bilateral principles to simple allocation problems (Dagan
and Volij 1997) and further extend these bilateral principles to allocation rules on
networks. We require the extension to preserve the essence of the bilateral principle for
any two-citizen simple allocation problem. We call this condition pairwise robustness
with respect to the bilateral principle. We provide an algorithm to extend a bilateral
principle to an allocation rule which is pairwise robust. This algorithm is parallel to
the ascending algorithms used in Moulin (1999) and Bochet et al. (2013, 2012). Then,
we show that each bilateral principle in this class has a unique extension which is
pairwise robust with respect to the bilateral principle (Theorem 1).
Next, to demonstrate the global implications of pairwise robustness, we define a
fairness condition in spirit of the Rawlsian criteria of distributive justice, which states
that any inequalities must benefit all citizens, and particularly must benefit those who
will receive the least (Rawls 1971). We show that for any consistent extension of
a bilateral principle to a simple allocation problem, there is a unique “Rawls fair”
rule with respect to that consistent extension and this rule is the extension given
by the ascending algorithm (Theorem 2). Also, as a corollary, we show that any
parametric principle can be extended to an allocation rule (Corollary 1). Finally, we
give applications of the algorithm for the egalitarian, the proportional, and the contested
garment bilateral principles (Example 1).
The literature on flow sharing on networks has focused on the computation of egal-
itarian solutions (Megiddo 1974, 1977; Brown 1979; Hall and Vohra 1993). Several
allocation rules for allocation problems on networks have recently been introduced
and axiomatized in Branzei et al. (2008), Bjørndal and Jörnsten (2010), Bochet et
al. (2012, 2013), Moulin and Sethuraman (2013), and Szwagrzak (2011). One way
to study allocation rules on networks is to represent the allocation problem as a net-
work flow problem where transfers between nodes are costly and analyze the related
minimum cost flow problem on a simple network and implement some known princi-
ples for simple allocation problems via suitable cost functions (Branzei et al. 2008).
Another way is to look for an extension of bilateral principles for two-person problems
to allocation rules (Bjørndal and Jörnsten 2010). Bjørndal and Jörnsten (2010) only
focus on the extension of the egalitarian and the contested garment bilateral principles
and their network structure is different than ours since they also have links between
the sources.
The egalitarian rule for allocation problems on networks has been characterized by
Pareto optimality, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness in Bochet et al.
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(2013).4 Their egalitarian rule is an extension of the uniform rule (Sprumont 1991)
to allocation problems on networks in an agent-consistent way, i.e., if an agent leaves
the problem with her assignment and the corresponding amount is reduced from the
sources she received her share, then in the remaining network, each remaining agent
should receive the same amount as in the original problem.
We want to emphasize that the aim of the paper is not to characterize any allocation
rule. We extend a large class of bilateral principles for two-citizen simple allocation
problems to allocation rules on a network in an agent-consistent manner.5 Our pairwise
robustness captures this “consistency” requirement. We implicitly assume that the
agents are not held responsible for their connections to the sources. This assumption
is reasonable in settings such as blood transfusions, or natural resource networks
(where geographical constraints play an important role for the network), or relief aid
networks after a natural disaster (where available network after the natural disaster
becomes important). An agent should not be responsible for her blood type or for
the lack of connections because it might not be possible to construct one or it is not
available after a natural disaster.
An alternative extension of simple allocation rules is in a node-consistent fashion,
i.e., in addition to agent-consistency, if a source leaves the problem with its endowment
and the corresponding amounts are reduced from the claims of the agents’ who were
receiving them from the source, then the new problem should assign the agents the
amounts they received in the original problem minus the amounts allocated from the
deleted source (Moulin and Sethuraman 2013). Another requirement in Moulin and
Sethuraman (2013) is edge-consistency which requires that if an edge is deleted from
the network of the original problem and the agent’s claim and the endowment of the
source which formed the deleted link is decreased by the amount flowing to the agent
from this source, then at the new problem the agent’s allocation should be equal to
the original allocation minus the amount which the deleted link used to carry. This is
a more demanding condition than node-consistency and it means that the agents are
held responsible for their connections. They show that the proportional principle has a
unique extension which satisfies both conditions, the egalitarian principle has infinitely
many extensions, and the Talmud principle (Aumann and Maschler 1985) does not have
an extension which satisfies both conditions.6 In general, their alternative notion of
extendability does not guarantee existence or uniqueness for those principles which are
only weakly resource monotonic, i.e. an increase in total endowment weakly benefits
the claimants. Their results motivated our examples in Sect. 4 where we show that
all three aforementioned principles have a unique extension which satisfies pairwise
robustness. Our example also shows that pairwise robustness is different from the
joint requirement of node-consistency and edge-consistency. Even though both our
paper and Moulin and Sethuraman (2013) give a unique extension of the proportional
principle, those extensions are not equivalent.
4 Szwagrzak (2011) also explores other properties of the egalitarian rule and other rules in this environment.
5 Note that we use the term “agent” interchangeably with the term “citizen”.
6 We use the definition of the Talmud principle following Aumann and Maschler (1985), which is the
consistent extension of the contested garment rule.
123
Allocation rules on networks 881
Bochet et al. (2012) study a similar model where suppliers and demanders of a
homogeneous commodity are embedded in a bipartite network. A transfer is possible
only between connected agents. Both suppliers and demanders have preferences over
the total amount they transfer. That is different from an allocation problem because
agents (demanders) receive the commodity from other agents (suppliers).7 In our
model, only one side of the bipartite network is formed by the agents, namely the
citizens.
Another related allocation problem is the one in which agents are located sequen-
tially on a line, the so-called river sharing problem (Ambec and Sprumont 2002;
Ambec and Ehlers 2008; Ansink and Weikard 2012). A river sharing problem can be
written as an allocation problem on a network where agents’ access to sources are
hierarchical.8 Hence, our model is more general than a river sharing problem as we
have no restrictions on the possible networks between sources and agents. Our model
is also different than the division of a single commodity supplied by multiple sources
as studied in Kar (2008). In their model, although an agent, a priori, can consume
from any source, she must receive all her allocation from a single source whereas an
agent in our model can receive her share from several of the sources to which she has
access.
In Sect. 2, we introduce the model and some properties of bilateral principles.
In Sect. 3, we present the algorithm and give the results. In Sect. 4, we give three
applications of the algorithm. We conclude in Sect. 5.
2 Model
For a finite set A, let |A| be its cardinality. Let S be the finite set of potential sources
and C be the finite set of potential citizens. Let S ⊆ S be the set of sources and
|S| = m, and C ⊆ C be the set of citizens and |C | = n. Each source t ∈ S has a
non-negative endowment st ∈ R+ and each citizen i ∈ C has a non-negative claim
ci ∈ R+ for the resource.
Let s = (s1, s2, . . . , sm) be the endowment vector and c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) be
the claims vector. Sources and citizens are embedded in a network in which citizens
can acquire the resource only from the sources they are connected to. A bipartite
graph g ⊆ S × C consists of links between nodes in S and C . If a link in g connects
a source t to a citizen i , i.e., ti ∈ g, then it is possible for citizen i to acquire the
resource from source t . Let Gm×n be the set of all connected bipartite graphs between
S and C .9 Let Ng(T) be the set of citizens connected to a subset of sources T ⊆ S
7 This problem has previously been studied without network constraints in Klaus et al. (1997, 1998) and
Kıbrıs and Küçükşenel (2009).
8 In more detail, the river sharing problem can be written as an allocation problem on a network in the
following manner: The initial stream reaching the first agent on the river and the rainfall received by every
agent are the sources in our network. The last agent on the river has access to all sources. The second from
the last agent has access to all sources except the rainfall of the last agent and in general an agent has access
to all sources except the rainfall of her downstream agents.
9 Throughout the paper, we assume that g is connected. Otherwise, we can treat each connected component
of g as a separate problem.
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Fig. 1 An example of a problem: R = (s, c, g) is a problem with S = {1, 2, 3, 4}, C =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, s = (1, 2, 2, 3), and c = (1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 6)
in g, i.e., Ng(T ) = {i ∈ C such that ti ∈ g for some t ∈ T }. Similarly, Ng(D) be
the set of sources connected to a subset of citizens D ⊆ C in g, i.e., Ng(D) = {t ∈
S such that t i ∈ g for some i ∈ D}.
An allocation problem, simply a problem, is a triple R = (s, c, g) such that for
each S ⊆ S, each C ⊆ C, each g ∈ Gm×n , and each T ⊂ S, we have ∑t∈T st <∑
i∈Ng(T ) ci . This means that no subset of sources has enough resource to satisfy the
claims of the citizens connected to them. Hence, the problem is “genuine” in the sense
that a citizen receives the resource always at the expense of some other citizen. Let
R(S, C) = Rm+ × Rn+ × Gm×n be the set of problems for the set of sources S and the
set of citizens C . Let R = ∪S⊆S,C⊆CR(S, C) be set of all problems. See Fig. 1 for
an example.
An allocation is a vector q = (q1, q2, . . . , qn) ∈ Rn+ that represents how much
resource is allocated to each citizen. A transfer of resources, or simply a flow, is a
vector φ ∈ RS×C+ , where φti is the amount sent from source t to citizen i such that if
ti /∈ g, then φti = 0.
An allocation q is feasible if there is a flow φ ∈ RS×C+ that supports it, i.e., for
each citizen i ∈ C, qi = ∑t∈Ng(i) φti and for each source t ∈ S,
∑
i∈Ng(t) φti ≤ st .
An allocation q satisfies claim boundedness if it is feasible and for each citizen
i ∈ C, qi ≤ ci . An allocation q is efficient if it is a feasible allocation that satisfies
claim boundedness and there is no other feasible allocation q ′ such that for each
citizen i ∈ C , we have ci ≥ q ′i ≥ qi and
∑
i q
′
i >
∑
i qi .
An allocation rule ϕ, simply a rule, is a function which assigns to each problem
(s, c, g) ∈ R an efficient allocation. Since each rule assigns an allocation to each
problem, there is a flow supporting that allocation. If φ(s, c, g) is a flow that supports
ϕ(s, c, g), then for each citizen i, ϕi (s, c, g) = ∑t∈Ng(i) φti (s, c, g).
A simple problem P = (c,ω) is a problem (s, c, g) ∈ R such that g = S × C and∑
i∈S si = ω with
∑
i∈C ci > ω. Note that P represents the problem of allocating an
amount ω ≥ 0 among the citizens in C . There is no restriction on the possible flows
and ω can be distributed freely. Let P(S, C) = Rn+×R+ be the set of simple problems
for the set of sources S and the set of citizens C . Let P = ∪S⊆S,C⊆CP(S, C) be the
set of all simple problems. A subset P2 = ∪S⊆S,C⊆C,|C|=2P(S, C) of P is the set of
all two-citizen simple problems.
A bilateral principle f is a principle that assigns to each two-citizen simple problem
an efficient allocation, i.e.,
∑
i∈C fi (c, ω) = ω and for each i ∈ C, fi (c, ω) ≤ ci . A
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principle F is a function defined over P that assigns to each simple problem (c, ω)
an efficient allocation.
A bilateral principle f is resource monotonic if for each pair of two-citizen simple
problems (c, ω) ∈ P2 and (c′, ω′) ∈ P2 with c = c′ and ω < ω′ and each i ∈ C ,
we have fi (c, ω) ≤ fi (c, ω′). Resource monotonicity requires that when the resource
increases, each citizen receives at least as much as he did initially.
A bilateral principle f is anonymous if for each two-citizen simple problem
((ci , c j ), ω) ∈ P2 if c′i = c j and c′j = ci , then fi ((ci , c j ), ω) = f j ((c′i , c′j ), ω).
Anonymity requires that the allocation given by the bilateral principle should not
depend on the names of the citizens.
Next, we define a property for principles. Suppose a principle has been applied to a
simple problem and some citizens leave with what they are prescribed by the principle
and the total resource prescribed to these citizens by the principle reduced from the
corresponding sources. If we apply the principle to the problem with the remaining
citizens and the remaining resources, then the initial prescribed allocation should not
change for the remaining citizen. A principle is consistent if it satisfies this invariance
property. Formally, a principle F is consistent if for each S ⊆ S, each C ⊆ C, each
simple problem (c, ω) ∈ P , each D ⊂ C , and each i ∈ C\D,
Fi (c−D, ω −
∑
j∈D
Fj (c, ω)) = Fi (c, ω)
where c−D is the claims vector of the citizens in C\D.
The weaker version of the property obtained by focusing only on subgroups of two
remaining citizens is called bilateral consistency. A bilateral principle f admits a
bilaterally consistent extension F to simple problems if F is bilaterally consistent
and coincides with f for each two-citizen simple problem. Similarly, a bilateral prin-
ciple f admits a consistent extension F to simple problems if F is consistent and
coincides with f for each two-citizen simple problem.
Let f be a bilateral principle, P = (c, ω) be a simple problem, and q be an allocation
satisfying claim-boundedness. The binary relation 	 f,q over the set of citizens C is
defined as in Dagan and Volij (1997):
	 f,q= {(i, j) ∈ C × C | fi ((ci , c j ), qi + q j ) < qi }.
A bilateral principle f is regular, if for each simple problem P and each allocation
q satisfying claim boundedness, the binary relation 	 f,q is transitive.
Dagan and Volij (1997) offer regularity as a necessary and sufficient condition
on a bilateral principle f which guarantees the existence of a consistent extension
of f to simple allocation problems. The binary relation reveals which of the two
citizens are treated more favorably in a simple allocation problem in comparison to
how the bilateral principle treats them in a two-citizen simple allocation problem.
The regularity condition requires this comparison to be transitive. In their Theorem
3.2, Dagan and Volij (1997) show that a resource monotonic and anonymous bilateral
principle has a unique extension to simple allocation problems if and only if it satisfies
regularity. That extension delivers the allocation in which the binary relation gives an
123
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equivalence between any pair of citizens.10 We build on this result to extend bilateral
principles further to allocation problems where the distribution is subject to network
constraints.
We focus on bilateral principles that satisfy resource monotonicity, anonymity, and
regularity. Our aim is to extend such a bilateral principle to a rule on a network. We
require the extension to preserve the essence of the bilateral principle. We formalize
this requirement by the following definition11:
Pairwise f-Robustness: Let R = (s, c, g) ∈ R be a problem and f be a bilateral
principle. A feasible allocation q is pairwise f -robust if for each pair of citizens
i, j ∈ C with f ((ci , c j ), qi +q j ) = (q∗i , q∗j ), there exists no feasible allocation q ′ for
R such that for each k = i, j, q ′k = qk and
|q∗i − q ′i | < |q∗i − qi | or |q∗j − q ′j | < |q∗j − q j |.
A rule ϕ is pairwise f -robust if for each problem (s, c, g) ∈ R, ϕ(s, c, g) = q
satisfies pairwise f -robustness.
The pairwise robustness condition is only concerned with the allocations of pairs
of citizens. To demonstrate the global implications of pairwise robustness, we define
a fairness condition on the overall allocation in spirit of the Rawlsian criteria of dis-
tributive justice. To do so, first we need to introduce some notation. For each x ∈ Rn ,
let x∗ be the order statistics of x , obtained by rearranging the coordinates of x in
increasing order: x∗1 ≤ x∗2 ≤ · · · ≤ x∗n . An allocation x Rawls dominates y if there
exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that x∗k ≥ y∗k and for each l with 1 ≤ l < k, x∗l = y∗l . We
denote this as x RD y.
Let R = (s, c, g)be a problem, q be an allocation, F be a principle, and i be a citizen.
The welfare observed by a citizen i at R from q with respect to F is wi (c, q, F) =
sup{ ω | qi = F(c, ω)}. At an allocation q, the citizen gets exactly what she would
have gotten at a simple problem (c, wi (c, q, F)) under principle F . Since there are
network constraints at R which hinder the free flow of resources, we use wi (c, q, F)
as a measure of how well the citizen i is treated at allocation q when principle F is
used as the allocation criteria. Let w(c, q, F) be the vector of welfare obtained by the
agents in C . Let w∗(c, q, F) be the order statistics of w(c, q, F).
Rawls F-Fairness: Let R = (s, c, g) be a problem and F be a principle. A feasible
allocation q is Rawls F-fair if for each feasible allocation q ′ = q,
w∗(c, q, F) RD w∗(c, q ′, F).
A rule ϕ is Rawls F-fair if for each problem (s, c, g) ∈ R, ϕ(s, c, g) = q is Rawls
F-fair.
10 We refer the reader to Dagan and Volij (1997) for an in-depth analysis of this condition and its implica-
tions.
11 Since each bilateral principle assigns an efficient allocation by definition, this condition is equivalent to
|q∗i − q ′i | < |q∗i − qi | and |q∗j − q ′j | < |q∗j − q j |.
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3 The ascending algorithm
Next, we construct an algorithm to extend each resource monotonic, anonymous, and
regular bilateral principle f to a rule ϕ f that is pairwise f -robust. We also show
that for each bilateral principle f , there is a unique pairwise f -robust rule. If f is
a bilateral principle that satisfies resource monotonicity, anonymity, and regularity,
then f has a unique bilaterally consistent extension F to simple problems (Aumann
and Maschler 1985; Dagan and Volij 1997). If a resource monotonic, anonymous, and
regular bilateral principle f admits a bilaterally consistent extension F , then F also
satisfies resource monotonicity (Hokari and Thomson 2008). Also, F is consistent
(Dagan and Volij 1997; Chun 1999).
Given the claims of the citizens c, consider the simple problem with a single source
of capacity ω ≥ 0. For each citizen i ∈ C , let Fi (c, ω) be the amount that citizen i
would have received under the principle F in the simple problem (c, ω). Note that by
resource monotonicity, Fi (c, ω) is increasing in ω.
We obtain the rule ϕ f by an ascending algorithm based on the following system
K (ω) of inequalities where ω is a non-negative parameter:
∑
i∈D
Fi (c, ω) ≤
∑
t∈Ng(D)
st for each D ⊆ C. (1)
For ω = 0, Eq. (1) is satisfied for each D ⊆ C . For ω = ∑i∈C ci , there exists D ⊆ C
such that ∑
i∈D
Fi (c, ω) >
∑
t∈Ng(D)
st
by construction. Hence, there exists a largest ω1 such that
∑
i∈D
Fi (c, ω
1) ≤
∑
t∈Ng(D)
st for each D ⊆ C and (2)
∑
i∈D
Fi (c, ω
1) =
∑
t∈Ng(D)
st for some D ⊆ C. (3)
Since
∑
t∈Ng(D) st is a submodular function of D, there exists a unique largest D
1
such that Eq. (3) holds. The allocation for the agents in D1 is obtained by setting
qi = Fi (c, ω1) for each i ∈ D1.
If D1 = C , the algorithm stops. Otherwise, the algorithm continues to assign alloca-
tions to the agents in the rest of the network (S\ Ng(D1), C \ D1, g\(Ng(D1)× D1)).
That is, we look for the largest ω2 > 0 such that
∑
i∈D
Fi (c, ω
2) ≤
∑
t∈Ng(D)\Ng(D1)
st for each D ⊆ C \ D1 and (4)
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∑
i∈D
Fi (c, ω
2) =
∑
t∈Ng(D)\Ng(D1)
st for some D ⊆ C \ D1. (5)
Then, there exists a unique largest set D2 such that Eq. (5) holds. Observe that ω2 > ω1.
Because if ω2 ≤ ω1, we can combine Eqs. (3) and (5) to obtain
∑
i∈D1∪D2
qi (c, ω
1) ≥
∑
i∈D1
qi (c, ω
1) +
∑
i∈D2
qi (c, ω
2) =
∑
t∈Ng(D1∪D2)
st
which contradicts the choice of D1 as the largest set satisfying Eq. (3).
If D1 ∪ D2 = C , then the algorithm stops. Otherwise, the algorithm continues iter-
atively to assign all agents their allocations. Since the network is finite, the algorithm
stops after a finite number of iterations.
The rule ϕ f assigns the allocation q obtained in the algorithm above.
Theorem 1 For each resource monotonic, anonymous, and regular bilateral principle
f, ϕ f extends f to a pairwise f -robust rule . Moreover, the extension is unique.
We prove Theorem 1 in three lemmas:
Lemma 1 (Theorem 3.2 in Dagan and Volij 1997) A resource monotonic, anony-
mous, and regular bilateral principle f has a unique consistent extension F to simple
problems.
Lemma 2 Suppose that a resource monotonic bilateral principle f has a consistent
extension F to simple problems. Then, ϕ f extends f to a pairwise f -robust rule.
Proof First, we show that the rule ϕ f obtained by the ascending algorithm is pairwise
f -robust. Let (s, c, g) be a problem, ϕ f (s, c, g) = q, and i, j ∈ C . First, suppose
that the ascending algorithm assigns to i and j their allocations in the same iteration
step, i.e., for the parameter obtained from the ascending algorithm, ω > 0, we have
qi = Fi (c, ω) and q j = Fj (c, ω). Consider the simple problem ((ci , c j ), qi + q j ).
Since F is consistent, F{i, j}(c, ω) = f ((ci , c j ), qi + q j ) = (qi , q j ). Hence, pairwise
f -robustness is trivially satisfied.
Next, suppose that the ascending algorithm assigns to i and j their allocations in
different iteration steps, i.e., for two different parameters obtained from the ascending
algorithm, ω, ω̃ > 0, we have qi = Fi (c, ω) and q j = Fj (c, ω̃). Assume without loss
of generality that ω̃ > ω.
If a resource monotone bilateral principle f has a consistent extension F , then F also
satisfies resource monotonicity (Hokari and Thomson 2008). By resource monotonic-
ity, we have qi = Fi (c, ω) ≤ Fi (c, ω̃) and q j = Fj (c, ω̃) ≥ Fj (c, ω). If one of these
inequalities is not strict, then F{i, j}(c, ω) = f ((ci , c j ), qi + q j ) = (qi , q j ) by the
same argument presented above. Hence, assume that qi = Fi (c, ω) < Fi (c, ω̃) and
q j = Fj (c, ω̃) > Fj (c, ω). Let Fi (c, ω̃) = q̄i and Fj (c, ω) = q̄ j . By consistency,
F{i, j}(c, ω) = f ((ci , c j ), qi + q̄ j ) = (qi , q̄ j ) and F{i, j}(c, ω̃) = f ((ci , c j ), q̄i +
q j ) = (q̄i , q j ). Then, by resource monotonicity, fi ((ci , c j ), qi + q j ) ≥ qi and
f j ((ci , c j ), qi + q j ) ≤ q j .
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Next, we show that it is not possible to increase i’s allocation when the allocations
of all citizens other than i and j remain the same. The algorithm assigns j’s allocation
at some step h̃ after assigning i’s allocation at some step h, i.e. h̃ > h. The citizens
who receive their allocations at step h obtain no resource from the sources they share
with citizens who receive their allocations earlier and receive all the resources of their
other connections (as given in Eqs. 3 and 5). The citizens who receive their allocations
at step h or earlier deplete all the sources they have access to. This implies that if
q ′ is a feasible allocation which coincides with q for citizens different from i and j ,
then necessarily q ′i ≤ qi . Hence, ϕ f obtained by the ascending algorithm is pairwise
f -robust. 
Lemma 3 Suppose that a resource monotonic bilateral principle f has a consistent
extension F to simple problems. Then, ϕ f is the unique extension of f that is pairwise
f -robust.
Proof Let ϕ f be the rule given by the ascending algorithm. Suppose there exists some
other rule ϕ = ϕ f which is also pairwise f -robust. Then, there exists a problem
(s, c, g) such that ϕ(s, c, g) = q ′ = q = ϕ f (s, c, g).
Let D1, D2, . . . , Dh be the sets of citizens which are allocated in steps 1, 2, . . . , h
of the ascending algorithm, respectively and let ω1 < ω2 < . . . < ωh be the cor-
responding parameters associated to the sets D1, D2, . . . , Dh in the ascending algo-
rithm. Suppose that there exists i ∈ D1 such that q ′i < qi . By construction, qi = Fi (c,
ω1).
Let φ′ be a flow which supports the allocation q ′. Consider the set of sources
S1 = Ng(i) connected to i . Let C1 = { j ∈ C : ∃t ∈ S1 such that φ′t j > 0}.
This set is non-empty since the resources which were assigned to i in q must now
be allocated to other citizens who share sources with i and the allocation q ′ is
efficient.
Suppose that there exists j ∈ C1 such that q ′j > q j . The citizen j receives her
allocation at some step d of the algorithm, for 1 ≤ d ≤ h with the associated parameter
ωd . Since d ≥ 1, ωd ≥ ω1 and q ′j > q j = Fj (c, ωd) ≥ Fj (c, ω1) by resource
monotonicity of extension F . Let q̄i = Fi (c, ωd). Since d ≥ 1, q̄i ≥ qi > q ′i . Due
to the consistency of F, f j ((ci , c j ), q̄i + q j ) = q j and fi ((ci , c j ), q̄i + q j ) = q̄i . If
q ′i + q ′j ≥ q̄i + q j , then by the resource monotonicity of f, fi ((ci , c j ), q ′i + q ′j ) ≥
q̄i > q ′i and f j ((ci , c j ), q ′i + q ′j ) < q ′j . If, on the contrary, q ′i + q ′j < q̄i + q j ,
then, again, by the resource monotonicity of f, f j ((ci , c j ), q ′i + q ′j ) ≤ q j < q ′j and
fi ((ci , c j ), q ′i + q ′j ) > q ′i .
It is possible to change allocation q ′ by transferring some arbitrarily small ε amount
from j to i through the path j t, ti without changing the allocations of citizens other
than i and j . Since the link j t carries a positive flow in φ′, such a transfer is possible,
contradicting pairwise f -robustness.
Next, suppose that for each citizen j ∈ C1, q ′j ≤ q j . Consider the set S2 = Ng(C1)
and C2 = { j ∈ C : ∃t ∈ S2 such that φ′t j > 0}. Since q ′i < qi and for each citizen
j ∈ C1, q ′j ≤ q j , C2 is non-empty because the resources received by i and agents in
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C1 at q must now be allocated to other citizens who share sources with those agents,
due to the efficiency of the allocation q ′.
Suppose that there exists j2 ∈ C2 such that q ′j2 > q j2 . By the same argument above,
we can conclude f j2((ci , c j2), q
′
i + q ′j2) < q ′j2 and fi ((ci , c j2), q ′i + q ′j2) > q ′i . It is
possible to change allocation q ′ by transferring some arbitrarily small ε amount from
j2 to i through a path j2t2, t2 j1, j1t1, t1i for some j2 ∈ C2, t2 ∈ S2, j1 ∈ C1, and
t1 ∈ S1, without changing the allocations of citizens other than i and j2, contradicting
pairwise f -robustness.
If there exists no j ∈ C2 such that q ′j > q j , then we continue iteratively to look
for a j such that q ′j > q j . Such a j exists since q ′i < qi and the rule ϕ is efficient.
Again, we can conclude by resource monotonicity f j ((ci , c j ), q ′i + q ′j ) < q ′j and
fi ((ci , c j ), q ′i +q ′j ) > q ′i . Using the construction in the paragraph above, it is possible
to make a transfer from j to i without changing the allocations of other citizens through
path, contradicting pairwise f -robustness.
If for each i ∈ D1, q ′i ≥ qi , then we have q ′i = qi for all i ∈ D1. Since q = q ′,
there exists i ∈ Dh1 such that for each h2 < h1 and each j ∈ Dh2 , q ′j = q j and
we can apply the same iterative argument starting from i to find a contradiction to
pairwise f -robustness.
Hence, ϕ f is the unique rule which is pairwise f -robust. 
Next, we consider Rawls’ criteria of justice and show that there is a unique Rawls
F-fair rule that is equal to the extension given by the algorithm.
Theorem 2 Let f be a resource monotonic, anonymous, and regular bilateral prin-
ciple and let F be the unique consistent extension of f to simple problems. Then, ϕ f
is the unique Rawls F-fair rule.
Proof Let f be a resource monotonic, anonymous, and regular bilateral principle and
let F be the unique consistent extension of f to simple problems. Let ϕ f be the rule
given by the ascending algorithm. Next, we show that ϕ f is the unique Rawls F-fair
rule.
Let R = (s, c, g) be a problem and ϕ f (s, c, g) = q. Let q ′ be a feasible allocation
such that q ′ = q. Let D1, D2, . . . , Dh be the sets of citizens which are allocated in
steps 1, 2, . . . , h of the ascending algorithm, respectively and let ω1 < ω2 < · · · <
ωh be the corresponding parameters associated to the sets D1, D2, . . . , Dh in the
ascending algorithm. Since q = q ′, there is a citizen i ∈ Dk for some 1 ≤ k ≤ h such
that qi > q ′i and for each 1 ≤ l < k, each citizen j ∈ Dl , q j = q ′j . Such a citizen
i ∈ Dk , which receives less in q ′ than in q, exists because at any flow which supports
q the citizens in Dk do not receive any resource from the sources they share with a
citizen j ∈ Dl for 1 ≤ l < k and exclusively deplete any source they do not share
with a citizen j ∈ Dl for 1 ≤ l < k.
By resource monotonicity, for some 0 ≤ ω′ < ωk , we have qi = Fi (c, ωk) and
q ′i = Fi (c, ω′). Hence, w∗(c, q, F) RD w∗(c, q ′, F). Therefore, ϕ f is the unique
Rawls F-fair rule. 
Finally, we define a family of principles. Before defining the family, we introduce
a fairness property. A principle satisfies equal treatment of equals if two citizens with
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Fig. 2 Egalitarian rule
equal claims receive equal amounts. Formally, F satisfies equal treatment of equals
if for each simple problem (c, ω) ∈ P and each pair of citizens i, j ∈ C with ci = c j ,
we have Fi (c, ω) = Fj (c, ω).
Let Φ be the family of functions φ : R+×[λ, λ] → R+, where −∞ ≤ λ ≤ λ ≤ ∞,
that are continuous, nowhere decreasing with respect to the second argument, and such
that for each c0 ∈ R+, we have φ(c0, λ) = 0 and φ(c0, λ) = c0.
Parametric principle of parametrization φ ∈ Φ, Fφ Let φ : R+ × [λ, λ] → R+ ∈
Φ is given. Then, for each (c, ω) ∈ P, Fφ selects the vector x ∈ Rn+ such that∑
i∈C xi = ω and there is λ ∈ [λ, λ] such that for each i ∈ C, xi = φ(ci , λ).
These principles are introduced and characterized by Young (1987). A principle is
a parametric principle if and only if it satisfies continuity, equal treatment of equals,
and bilateral consistency. We also know that any parametric principle is resource
monotonic (Young 1987). Hence, by rearranging the proof of Theorem 1, we have the
following corollary:
Corollary 1 Any parametric principle f for simple problems is uniquely extendable
to a pairwise f -robust rule.
4 An example with three rules
We apply the ascending algorithm to the example in Fig. 1 to extend the egalitarian,
the proportional, and the contested garment bilateral principles. The examples help to
illustrate that while extending different bilateral principles, the ascending algorithm
might result in different decompositions and even when the decompositions are the
same, the final allocations are different.
Example 1 Consider the problem R = (s, c, g) with S = {1, 2, 3, 4}, C =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, s = (1, 2, 2, 3), c = (1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 6), and g is given in Fig. 1.
The first rule is the egalitarian rule based on egalitarian bilateral principle.
Egalitarian Bilateral Principle, e : For each P = (c, ω) ∈ P2, the egalitarian bilateral
principle assigns the allocation e(c,ω) = q such that for each i ∈ C, qi = min{ci , λ}
where λ solves
∑
i∈C min{ci , λ} = ω.
The ascending algorithm which extends the egalitarian bilateral principle decom-
poses the graph into two parts after two iterations. After the first iteration, ω1 = 6
and D1 = {1, 2, 3}. The ascending algorithm terminates after the second itera-
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Fig. 3 Proportional rule
Fig. 4 Talmud rule
tion with ω2 = 263 and D2 = {4, 5, 6}. The egalitarian rule assigns ϕe(s, c, g) =(
1, 1, 1, 53 ,
5
3 ,
5
3
)
(Fig. 2).
The second rule is the proportional rule based on proportional bilateral principle.
Proportional Bilateral Principle, p: For each P = (c, ω) ∈ P2, the proportional
bilateral principle assigns the allocation p(c,ω) = q = πc where π = ω∑
i∈C ci
.
The ascending algorithm which extends the proportional bilateral principle decom-
poses the graph into two parts after two iterations . After the first iteration, ω1 = 152
and D1 = {6}. The ascending algorithm terminates after the second iteration with
ω2 = 253 and D2 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The proportional rule assigns ϕ p(s, c, g) =(
5
9 ,
5
9 ,
10
9 ,
10
9 ,
15
9 , 3
)
(Fig. 3).
The third rule is the Talmud rule based on the contested garment bilateral principle.
The consistent extension of the contested garment bilateral principle is the Talmud
principle (Aumann and Maschler 1985). To define this bilateral principle, we first
define the equal-sacrifice bilateral principle. For each P = (c, ω) ∈ P2, the equal-
sacrifice bilateral principle assigns the allocation l(c,ω) = q such that for each i ∈
C, qi = max{0, ci − σ } where σ solves ∑i∈C max{0, ci − σ } = ω.
Contested Garment Bilateral Principle, t: For each P = (c, ω) ∈ P2, the contested
garment bilateral principle assigns the allocation t(c,ω) = q such that for each i ∈
C, qi = e
(
c
2 , min{ ci +c j2 , ω}
)
+ l
(
c
2 , max{0, ω − ci +c j2 }
)
.
The ascending algorithm which extends the contested garment bilateral principle
decomposes the graph into two parts after two iterations as seen in Fig. 3. After
the first iteration, ω1 = 152 and D1 = {6}. At the next iteration, ω2 = 10 and
D2 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The Talmud rule assigns ϕt (s, c, g) = ( 12 , 12 , 1, 1, 2, 3
)
(Fig. 4).
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5 Conclusion
Our results expand the scope of the existing literature on claims problems. We provide
a way to apply bilateral principles to problems on networks of sources and citizens. The
extension exists and is unique for a large class of bilateral principles. Such problems
with multiple sources are very commonly observed as exemplified in the introduction.
Our extension satisfies two equivalent fairness conditions. The pairwise robustness is
concerned with the allocation of any pair of players while Rawls fairness is a condition
on the whole allocation. We hope that these two conditions help to understand one
another and how our extension functions on both a local and a global scale.
Moreover, the network model raises new theoretical problems. All the questions one
can ask for simple allocation problems are relevant for the network setting and there are
new issues due to the richness of the structure. Our extension shows that most widely
used principles of allocation are relevant also for this setting. Bochet et al. (2012, 2013)
and Szwagrzak (2011) have successfully adopted some axioms originally defined for
simple allocation problems (e.g. equal treatment of equals, replacement principle etc.)
and characterize some allocation rules for network allocation problems. But many
more questions remain than those already answered. We would like to underline two
such questions:
– Is it possible to characterize rules on the basis of how they respond to changes in
the network structure?
– The dual of a problem (Thomson 2006) is well-defined when there is only one
source. Can the dual of a network allocation problem be defined?
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892 R. İlkılıç, Ç. Kayı
Branzei R, Ferrari G, Fragnelli V, Tijs S (2008) A flow approach to bankruptcy problems. AUCO Czech
Econ Rev 2:146–153
Brown J (1979) The sharing problem. Oper Res 27:324–340
Chun Y (1999) Equivalance of axioms for bankruptcy problems. Int J Game Theory 28:511–520
Dagan N, Volij O (1997) Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy
problems. Int J Game Theory 26:11–25
Hall NG, Vohra R (1993) Towards equitable distribution via proportional equity constraints. Math Program
58:287–294
Hoekstra A (2006) The global dimension of water governance: nine reasons for global arrangements in
order to cope with local problems. Value of Water Research Report Series 20. UNESCO-IHE Institute
for Water Education
Hokari T, Thomson W (2008) On the properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency. J Math
Econ 44:211–231
İlkılıç R (2011) Networks of common property resources. Econ Theory 47:105–134
Kar A, Kıbrıs O (2008) Allocating multiple estates among agents with single-peaked preferences. Soc
Choice Welf 31:641–666
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